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 Bidding Rings
 By R. PRESTON MCAFEE AND JOHN MCMILLAN*
 We characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel, in
 which the bidders cannot make side-payments; and a strong cartel, in which the
 cartel members can exclude new entrants and can make transfer payments. The
 weak cartel can do no better than have its members submit identical bids. The
 strong cartel in effect reauctions the good among the cartel members. (JEL
 D44, D82, L41)
 A successful cartel must overcome at least
 four obstacles. First, the conspirators must
 devise some mechanism for dividing the
 spoils. Each cartel member has an incentive
 to argue for a bigger share. Second, an
 agreement is worthless without some way of
 enforcing it. Since contracts to fix prices
 cannot usually be written, any collusive
 agreement must be designed to be self-
 enforcing. Third, collusion contains the
 seeds of its own destruction. The high prof-
 its earned in a successfully colluding indus-
 try attract new firms into the industry; the
 competition from those new entrants then
 tends to destroy the collusive arrangements.
 Fourth, the victims of the cartel, on the
 other side of the market, may take actions
 to destabilize it. The first of these problems
 is empirically at least as important as the
 other three: for example, in a sample of
 international cartels that were temporarily
 successful but then broke down, almost half
 were destroyed by internal squabbling over
 how to share the profits (Paul Eckbo, 1976
 Ch. 3). Most of the U.S. Department of
 Justice's bid-rigging convictions begin when
 one of the cartel members, dissatisfied with
 his share of the spoils, turns in his cocon-
 spirators.
 The main subject of this paper is how
 cartels overcome the division-of-the-spoils
 difficulties, in the specific context of bidding
 at auctions.1 The colluding bidders must
 overcome an adverse-selection problem:
 they do not know how much each of their
 fellow cartel members is willing to pay for
 the item being sold. We shall derive the
 optimal mechanism for the cartel to use to
 decide who receives the item and how the
 proceeds are distributed. Our model will
 also have something to say about two of the
 other cartel problems listed above: entry
 deterrence and active seller responses. We
 shall, however, have nothing to add to what
 has already been said about cartel enforce-
 ment (see e.g., George Stigler, 1964; Dilip
 Abreu et al., 1986).
 We examine primarily all-inclusive bidder
 cartels at sealed-bid first-price auctions,2
 except in Section VI, where we offer a par-
 tial analysis for bidder cartels that contain
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 1Biddings conspiracies are prevalent enough to have
 added some exotic locutions to the English language.
 Cartels are variously called "rings," "pies," and
 "kippers." A "schlepper" is an insincere bidder at-
 tracted solely by the cartel's profits, and a "shill" is a
 phony bidder used by the auctioneer to drive up the
 price. A "knockout" is a private auction held by the
 cartel to determine which member gets the item and
 how much he pays the other members.
 20n collusions not involving all bidders and on
 collusion in English and second-price auctions, see
 Daniel Graham and Robert Marshall (1987), Thomas
 von Ungern-Sternberg (1988), and George Malaith and
 Peter Zemsky (1991).
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 only some of the bidders. Our analysis will
 explain two commonly observed forms of
 cartel organization. One set of results is
 about weak cartels, by which we mean car-
 tels whose members are unable to make
 transfer payments among themselves. We
 will show that in weak cartels all bidders
 submit exactly the same bid. This may ex-
 plain why, in the bidding for government
 contracts, it has been often the case that all
 bids are identical to the last cent. The sec-
 ond set of results is about strong cartels:
 cartels that can both make transfer pay-
 ments and exclude new entrants. A common
 method by which a cartel decides which
 bidder is to get the item and the size of the
 transfers is to hold its own illicit auction.
 Our model will show that this is an optimal
 mechanism for the cartel.
 While explicit collusion is illegal in the
 United States, the legality of implicit collu-
 sion is ambiguous; lawyers are still dis-
 cussing the nature of the evidence that is
 needed in order to prosecute for collusion.
 Even if it is illegal, implicit collusion is more
 difficult to detect and prove than explicit
 collusion. Thus, although we shall find that
 a cartel that makes transfer payments among
 its members is more profitable than one
 that does not, bidders may prefer to collude
 implicitly if the risk of detection and the
 severity of punishment of explicit collusion
 (not modeled here) are sufficiently great.
 In terms of the amounts of money in-
 volved, some of the most significant cases of
 collusion occur in the bidding for govern-
 ment contracts.3 Although our model will be
 expressed in terms of selling, with appropri-
 ate sign changes it can easily be converted
 into a model of contract bidding.
 I. Enforcement
 In order to collude, the bidders must re-
 solve their asymmetric-information prob-
 lem: they must have some way of selecting a
 winner and a winning bid. We model this by
 supposing that the bidders use a mechanism
 prior to the realization of the information,
 that is, a decision rule that assigns bids and
 (in some cases) transfers, based on the bid-
 ders' reports. The phases-of-the-moon sys-
 tem used by the electrical-equipment con-
 spiracy (Richard Smith, 1961) is an example
 of a mechanism. By the revelation principle
 (Roger Myerson, 1985), we may without loss
 of generality restrict attention to direct, in-
 centive-compatible mechanisms, in which
 each bidder reports his valuation to the
 mechanism and has incentives to do so hon-
 estly. The revelation principle states that
 the outcome of any mechanism that is not
 incentive-compatible can be mimicked by
 one that is incentive-compatible, so that
 honesty can be assumed without loss of
 generality. A direct mechanism, then, takes
 the vector of the bidders' reports of valua-
 tions and dictates bids and (perhaps) trans-
 fers to each bidder. We shall assume that
 the cartel designs the mechanism to maxi-
 mize the ex ante (before the valuations are
 known) sum of bidders' expected profits in
 the auction.
 The seller's behavior is passive. The seller
 announces a reserve price and sells at the
 highest bid to the highest bidder. In the
 event of a tie, the seller is presumed to
 randomize equally over the bidders with the
 highest bid. It will transpire that such be-
 havior on the part of the seller, which is
 employed in most government procurement
 auctions, is not a best response against the
 existence of a cartel. Therefore, we are as-
 suming that the seller either does not know
 he faces a cartel or is bound to the rules of
 the sealed-bid auction by law.
 The model we develop is static: it focuses
 on behavior in a single auction. However,
 the cartel rules require an enforcement
 mechanism, for there will be an individual
 incentive to defect. Although we shall con-
 sider various kinds of cartel mechanisms, it
 will turn out that the mechanism works by
 assigning either a maximum amount that
 any member may bid or (in the case in
 which side-payments are possible) by desig-
 nating the identity of the winner and the
 According to the U.S. Justice Department's an-
 titrust chief, bid-rigging by highway contractors in-
 creased the cost of building roads by 10 percent or
 more (New York Times, 4 April 1988, p. 29). Bid-rig-
 ging is widespread in Japan's public-works contracting
 and has contributed to U.S.-Japan trade friction
 (McMillan, 1991).
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 designated winner's bid. In either case, the
 information necessary to implement an en-
 forcement strategy (i.e., to detect deviations
 from actions the mechanism prescribes) is
 at most the identity and bid of the winning
 bidder. We shall assume that these two
 pieces of information become public. This
 information is made available, by law, in
 government procurement auctions (with the
 exception of certain Department of Defense
 projects) (see Stigler, 1964; George Hay and
 Daniel Kelley, 1974; Richard Posner, 1976
 p. 62; Charles Geiss and John Kuhlman,
 1978).
 The enforcement needed to ensure that
 the members comply with the cartel mecha-
 nism can come from one of two sources.
 First, the cartel may hire an enforcer who
 punishes any observed deviating bidders-
 an organized-crime approach. The alterna-
 tive avenue is to appeal to a grim trigger
 strategy in an infinitely repeated auction
 context4 (Abreu et al., 1986). Although we
 do not model dynamics explicitly, it is clear
 that cooperation is one of the equilibria in
 the infinitely repeated noncooperative game.
 A deviating bidder can be threatened with
 noncooperative profit levels in all future
 auctions should he win the current auction
 when the mechanism dictated otherwise.
 This threat will be sufficient to deter devia-
 tions if discounting is sufficiently low. Al-
 though maximal profits represent only one
 equilibrium among a plethora of repeated-
 game equilibria (James Friedman, 1986), a
 cartel that is choosing its mechanism has an
 obvious incentive to coordinate on this equi-
 librium. Anecdotal evidence from antiques
 and artwork auctions indicates that retalia-
 tory strategies are in fact used to enforce
 collusion: "When one of the members of
 the ring goes against his partners..., or the
 ring falls out for one reason or another,
 then it works very much to the seller's ad-
 vantage as vindicative competition leads to
 crazy prices" (Jeremy Cooper, 1977 pp.
 37-8). Similarly, retaliation in subsequent
 auctions was the enforcement mechanism
 used by the electrical-equipment conspiracy
 (Smith, 1961 p. 175) and by highway-con-
 struction cartels (Steven Flax, 1983 p. 80).
 We assume, therefore, that some punish-
 ment is available to the cartel, so that no
 cartel member will ever disregard the mech-
 anism when the mechanism dictates that he
 bid to lose. Because our primary interest is
 in examining the constraints on the cartel
 that result from the privacy of the cartel
 members' information, the model to be de-
 veloped endows the cartel with the ability to
 ensure obedience to the cartel mechanism's
 orders, but not with the ability to prevent
 any cartel member from lying to the cartel
 mechanism, except insofar as the cartel
 mechanism can be designed so as to make
 honesty optimal.
 II. Modeling Issues
 We suppose that a unique item is to be
 sold by sealed-bid auction to one of a set of
 risk-neutral bidders. The distinctive feature
 of an auction is asymmetric information: if
 the seller knew the bidders' demands, he
 would simply post a price. We model the
 asymmetry of information by assuming that
 bidder i, i = 1, ... , n, knows his own willing-
 ness to pay, vi, while all the other bidders
 and the seller perceive vi as an independent
 draw from a cumulative distribution F. As-
 sume that F has a differentiable density f
 with support [0, Vh].
 The assumption of independent draws,
 which is ubiquitous in the mechanism-
 design literature, rules out correlated valua-
 tions and therefore may make the model
 inapplicable to some real-world auctions in
 which collusion occurs. For example, if the
 perceived value of a piece of art depends on
 its unknown future value and if the bidders'
 predictions of the future value are corre-
 lated, then this model does not apply (Paul
 Milgrom and Robert Weber, 1982). How-
 ever, the independent-private-values as-
 sumption is not inconsistent with there be-
 ing some factors that influence all bidders'
 valuations. For example, if the determinants
 4In order to appeal to the repeated-auction inter-
 pretation, we must assume that the bidders draw their
 valuations anew before each auction, so that it is the
 same private-information game that is repeated. For an
 alternative case, see Peter C. Cramton and Thomas R.
 Palfrey (1990).
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 of the artwork's future price are known and
 equally weighted by all of the bidders, the
 independence assumption is satisfied. Also,
 if the actual value is vi = p + wj, where wi
 represents the bidder's personal valuation
 of the item and p is its unknown future
 market price, the same for all bidders and
 independent of the w 's, then the indepen-
 dent-private-values model still applies. Thus,
 the analysis to follow applies to situations
 with common-value elements, provided all
 the bidders have the same information about
 the common aspects.
 A further reason for focusing on the inde-
 pendent-private-values case is that, in the
 pure common-value case, the optimal cartel
 mechanism is simple if the cartel members
 can communicate with each other. In the
 pure common-value case, efficiency is at-
 tained regardless of which bidder wins. The
 cartel can therefore use some exogenous
 method to pick which of its members is to
 win. It then asks each bidder to report his
 private information about the item's true
 value. Since the report does not affect the
 probability of winning, there is no incentive
 to misrepresent this information. Based on
 the pooled information, the cartel decides
 whether the expected value of the item ex-
 ceeds the reserve price; if it does, the as-
 signed bidder bids the reserve price without
 competition (cf. McAfee et al., 1989).
 The cartel mechanism works as follows.
 After the bidders have reported their valu-
 ations to the mechanism, the ith bidder is
 awarded the good with probability
 hi(vo,vdi), where v-i represents the vector
 of others' reports (equal to true values in
 equilibrium). Bidder i's expected profit, if
 he has value vi but reports wi, is
 (1) 7i= v = Eivihi(wiVi)-Ti(wi,v_i)I
 where E-i is the expectation over v_ and
 Ti is the expected payment by bidder i. If
 transfers are prohibited, Ti is the bid
 weighted by the probability of winning. If
 transfers are allowed, Ti is the weighted bid
 plus the net transfer. From Roger Gues-
 nerie and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1984), in-
 centive compatibility is equivalent to5
 dvr
 (2) dv = Eihi(vi,v-i)
 and
 d
 (3) E _hj(vj,v_j) ? 0. dv.
 On a priori grounds, one can imagine
 four kinds of collusive mechanism, defined
 by the instruments available. Listed roughly
 in order of ease of detection by outsiders,
 these are: first, the tacit mechanism, in
 which there are no transfers and the ith
 bidder's bid depends only on his own valua-
 tion; second, the coordinative mechanism,
 in which there are no transfers, but the bids
 may depend upon the entire vector of re-
 ports; third, the transfer mechanism, which
 has side-payments, but they must sum to
 zero for every realization of the vector of
 valuations; and fourth, the budget-breaking
 mechanism, in which the side-payment con-
 straint is relaxed so that transfers need sum
 to zero only on average. Tacit collusion is
 probably legal in the United States and is in
 any case probably undetectable, since no
 contact among the bidders is needed to
 operate the mechanism. The bidders need
 not even know who the other bidders are. A
 coordinative collusion runs some risk of de-
 tection, since the communications might be
 intercepted. Transfers generate an addi-
 tional potential source of evidence. Finally,
 a budget-breaking collusion is still more
 risky, as it must employ a third party (the
 budget-breaker) who does not value the item
 sThe proof is as follows. Let a(w) = E_jhj(w,v_j)
 and b(w)= E_iT(w,v_j), so lr(v,w)= va(w)- b(w).
 Note that O = -w(v, v) = va'(v) - b'(v) is equivalent to
 (2). Differentiating 0 = 7rw(v, v) yields 0 = 711W(U v) +
 7rww(v, v), and therefore the necessary second-order
 condition yields 0 < 7rL,W(v, v), which is (3). To obtain
 sufficiency, note that 7,1 w(w,w) ? 0 implies 7r, w(v,w)
 ? 0 (v has dropped out) and thus 7r (v,w) < o as
 w > v, implying 7r(v, w) < ir(v, v). We shall abuse nota-
 tion and write nr(v)=maxWr(v,w)=7r(v,v). This
 logic was first applied by Myerson (1981).
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 being sold. We shall investigate all four
 types of cartel (although, as we shall find,
 there are actually only two different types,
 defined by the presence or absence of trans-
 fers).6 The mechanism is chosen to maxi-
 mize ex ante profits prior to the realization
 of valuations (in contrast to Cramton and
 Palfrey [1990]).
 In the next two sections we shall take as
 given the seller's policy: the seller offers to
 sell the item by sealed bid to the highest
 bidder, provided the bid exceeds some an-
 nounced level r. This may be a reserve price
 set at the lowest possible valuation that a
 bidder could have, at the seller's own valua-
 tion of the item, or at some level higher
 than the seller's valuation so as to exploit
 the seller's monopoly power. Alternatively
 (and in some cases more realistically), r
 might represent the cartel members' shared
 perception of how low a bid they can get
 away with, without either causing the seller
 to refuse to sell or arousing the suspicion of
 the antitrust authorities. We shall for brevity
 call r the minimum price, and we assume
 that it is known to all bidders.
 III. Weak Cartels
 For the first result of this section, we
 assume that the cartel operates under a
 handicap: the cartel members are unable to
 make transfer payments to each other. We
 leave this restriction unexplained, but one
 reason might be that transfers give rise to a
 risk of prosecution by the antitrust authori-
 ties that is sufficient to induce the cartel
 members to eschew their use.
 The cartel mechanism is efficient pro-
 vided bidder i wins if and only if his value
 exceeds both the minimum price and all the
 other bidders' values. The latter occurs with
 probability F(Vi)n - . Hence efficiency is
 characterized by
 (4) E_jhj(v,v_j) = ( O - i v' > r
 A profit-maximizing cartel clearly prefers
 efficiency in the absence of incentive con-
 straints, so that the pie to be divided among
 the members is as large as possible. How-
 ever, we shall find that the impossibility of
 transfers prevents efficient collusion. The
 bidder who values the item the most does
 not necessarily get it: collusion is inherently
 limited.
 LEMMA: If a cartel member whose value is
 less than or equal to the minimum price r is
 constrained to earn zero profit, then efficiency
 implies noncooperative profit levels.7
 Assume that it is common knowledge that,
 in the event of two or more bidders being
 tied for the highest bid, the seller awards
 the good randomly, with equal likelihood to
 each of the tied bidders.
 Let H(v) = [1 - F(v)]/f(v). We consider
 two cases. First, H'(v) 2 0 for all v E (O, oo);
 and second, H'(v) < 0 for all v E (O, Vh).
 The latter can be thought of as the more
 likely case, as it is satisfied by most common
 distributions. The expected value of H(v)
 (with expectations taken over the distribu-
 tion of the highest valuation) is the ex-
 pected rent earned by the winning bidder in
 a noncooperative auction (see McAfee and
 McMillan [1987] for details). Thus, H(v) is
 an index of the winning bidder's profit in
 expected terms, and H'(v) < 0 implies that
 high-value bidders produce relatively less
 profits.
 THEOREM 1: Suppose transfers are impos-
 sible. In the case H'(v) 2 0, optimal implicit
 collusion involves noncooperative bidding. In
 the case H'(v) < 0, it has
 (5) B(vi,v-i) = 0 vj < r.
 Thus, if transfers are prohibited, optimal
 collusion [in the case H'(v) < O] has every
 6A related problem is collusion in a Cournot oligo-
 ply when the firms' production costs are private infor-
 mation. This has been modeled by Cramton and
 Palfrey (1990) and Kevin Roberts (1985).  7A1 proofs are in the Appendix.
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 bidder who values the item at more than
 the minimum price submitting the same bid,
 namely, the minimum price. This is because,
 in the absence of side-payments, incentive
 compatibility requires that the good be
 awarded stochastically, with equal probabil-
 ity of being awarded to anyone whose value
 is larger than the minimum price: any at-
 tempt to arrange that the highest-value
 bidder wins generates incentives for the
 bidders to misstate their valuations. By sub-
 mitting equal bids, the bidders in effect use
 the seller as their randomizing device.
 The mechanism in Theorem 1 works by
 having the bidders report their valuations to
 the mechanism (correctly, since incentive-
 compatibility constraints are imposed), and
 the mechanism then recommends a bid to
 each bidder (which it is in the bidder's in-
 terest to adhere to). The proof of Theorem
 1 allowed the mechanism to recommend
 bids that are a function of all bidders' re-
 ports. However, as Theorem 1 shows, this is
 not needed: each bid is a function of the
 bidder's own report alone. This means that
 the optimal mechanism can be implemented
 in a decentralized way: the bidders need not
 actually report to the mechanism, but sim-
 ply bid r if and only if their valuations
 exceed r. In this sense, although the analy-
 sis allows the possibility of coordination, the
 optimal mechanism can be implemented
 without coordination.
 Bidding according to the phases of the
 moon is an example of a correlated equilib-
 rium. Can the cartel do better than using
 identical bidding by going to a correlated
 equilibrium? The answer is no. This is be-
 cause our analysis allowed the bidders to
 communicate with the mechanism. The set
 of equilibria in such a game includes the set
 of correlated equilibria: the revelation prin-
 ciple picks out all correlated equilibria
 (Myerson, 1985).
 Collusion without transfers has two ef-
 fects relative to noncooperative bidding.
 First, the payment to the seller is reduced.
 Second, the average valuation of the win-
 ning bidder is decreased, because the win-
 ner is no longer efficiently selected. The
 condition H'(v) < 0 guarantees that the for-
 mer effect outweights the latter.
 For H'(v) 2 0 for all v, it must be that
 the density function f(v) is sufficiently neg-
 atively sloped everywhere. While this is ob-
 viously unlikely to be satisfied, it is satisfied
 for the exponential distribution. In this case,
 the scheme (5) does not improve on nonco-
 operative bidding. Another case for which
 intuition suggests that identical bidding
 would break down occurs when the density
 function is such that, with high probability,
 a bidder's valuation is either very high or
 very low. In this case, the monotonicity of
 H(v), assumed in Theorem 1, is violated.
 The theoretically optimal scheme (5) has
 a striking real-world counterpart. According
 to F. M. Scherer (1970 p. 182), "Each year
 the federal and state governments receive
 thousands of sets of identical bids in the
 sealed bid competitions they sponsor." The
 pervasiveness of identical bidding in U.S.,
 Canadian, and European government con-
 tracting has been noted also by Vernon
 Mund (1960), Paul Cook (1963), Hay and
 Kelley (1974), William Comanor and Mark
 Schankerman (1976), Organisation for Eco-
 nomic Cooperation and Development (1976
 p. 20), and Christopher Green (1985 pp.
 176-7).8 Despite its prevalence, however,
 the phenomenon has not heretofore been
 satisfactorily explained. Why do the bidding
 firms choose such an apparently naive form
 of coordination? The answer, implied by
 Theorem 1, is that, given the asymmetry of
 information-the firms cannot observe each
 other's production costs-identical bidding
 is the best the cartel can do short of using
 side-payments.
 We now consider an alternative (but, we
 shall show, equivalent) limitation on the
 bidders' ability to collude. This is based on
 the empirical observation that the most
 common reason for cartels to founder is
 their inability to prevent entry. We consider
 an extreme form of entry possibilities. Sup-
 pose, in addition to the n serious bidders,
 there is a very large number of bidders with
 8Remarkable precision can be achieved: for exam-
 ple, in one sealed-bid tender to a Canadian local
 government, all nine bids were for $6,009.15 (Green,
 1985 p. 177).
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 low values, values less than r, and that
 these low-value bidders cannot be identified
 directly from observation. If the cartel is
 open to anyone, these individuals would
 have an incentive to join, in order to partici-
 pate in the cartel's sharing of profits, al-
 though they would never actually win an
 item. If there are enough of these individu-
 als, the cartel must discourage them from
 claiming that they are actually high-value-
 distribution types. One way to do this is to
 offer zero profits to bidders with low values:
 (6) 7r()0.
 Note that, if these nonserious bidders, or
 "schleppers," come from distributions which
 have a positive probability of values in ex-
 cess of the reserve price, then one of them
 may be the efficient owner of the item and
 should be included in the cartel. Because of
 the asymmetry we have assumed, this envi-
 ronment is not encompassed by the present
 model. However, if the schleppers are drawn
 from a distribution with support below r, so
 that they have no effect on the noncoopera-
 tive allocation, they may still desire to join
 the cartel. A cartel that faces sporadic real
 entry (by bidders who will receive draws
 from distribution F) may wish to design the
 mechanism to deter participation of schlep-
 pers.
 One justification for this is as follows. If
 there are infinitely many bidders with distri-
 bution G, with maximum r, a seller will
 never post a reserve price less than r, since
 someone is willing to pay r. If there are n
 bidders with valuations to be drawn from F
 (but not yet drawn), any one of these bid-
 ders would like to form a cartel that ex-
 cludes the G-type bidders, because they dis-
 sipate the rents. If the distributional type
 cannot be identified, then -ri(r) < 0 is nec-
 essary.9
 Although this schlepper story is clearly an
 incomplete description of a cartel entry
 problem, the next theorem demonstrates the
 force of the entry-exclusion constraint (6).
 THEOREM 2: If (6) holds, the bidders' ex-
 pected profits are maximized by the mecha-
 nisms of Theorem 1, even if transfers are
 possible.
 Thus, the no-entry constraint (bidders with
 value equal to the reserve price earn zero
 profits) means that side-payments are use-
 less; the optimal mechanism can be imple-
 mented without transfers.
 Theorems 1 and 2 establish a three-way
 equivalence among cartels: (i) without
 transfers and without coordination; (ii)
 without transfers and with coordination; and
 (iii) with transfers but with zero profit at the
 reserve price. The intuition for this is that,
 first, the inability to make transfers implies
 that profit at the minimum price must be
 zero (because, without transfers, a bidder
 with value less than r who wins earns nega-
 tive profit, so it is better for the cartel
 [maximizing total expected profit] for such a
 bidder never to win). Second, profit at the
 minimum price being constrained to be zero
 implies that the maximum attainable cartel
 profit can be achieved without using trans-
 fers [because (6) implies that some bidders
 receive zero transfers; thus any transfer
 scheme cannot be lump-sum and the high-
 est-valuation bidder who fails to receive a
 transfer has an incentive to overstate his
 valuation].
 Sometimes the cartel might choose a co-
 ordinated-bidding mechanism instead of the
 identical-bidding mechanism of Theorem 1.
 This mechanism would have some device
 (such as the phases of the moon) to choose
 which bidder's turn it is to bid. This bidder
 is then asked if he wants the item at the
 9In a cartel practice among bidders for government
 contracts in Europe described by the Organisation for
 Economic Co-operation and Development (1976 p. 22),
 the cartel is able to exclude what we describe as
 nonserious bidders: "No compensation is paid to firms
 suspected of participating in meetings of would-be
 tenderers held before the tender takes place simply in
 order to obtain compensation; ... compensation will
 be paid only if tenderers are in possession of a 'claim':
 a tenderer obtains a claim after completing a building,
 for example. This claim may be used only once. If a
 building contractor wishes to receive such compensa-
 tion regularly, he must ply his trade regularly."
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 price r. If he does, he bids an amount r
 unopposed (or with token opposition-
 "rival" bids less than r). If he does not want
 it, the next bidder on the list is asked. This
 was how the electrical-equipment conspir-
 acy operated, for example. The total ex-
 pected profits from this mechanism are the
 same as from the identical-bidding mecha-
 nism, but in practice it requires more coor-
 dination, which creates a risk of cartel com-
 munications being detected but reduces the
 evidence given directly from bidding. Co-
 manor and Schankman (1976) found that
 rotating-bid arrangements were significantly
 more common in cartels with few members
 than in cartels with many members, reflect-
 ing the extra difficulties of setting up and
 running a rotating-bid mechanism.
 There are, however, two situations in
 which a cartel would prefer a rotating-bid
 mechanism to identical bidding. First, iden-
 tical bidding results in each bidder winning
 with equal probability. Sometimes cartels
 seek a different division of the spoils
 from this. For example, in the electrical-
 equipment conspiracy, circuit-breaker con-
 tracts were allocated so that General
 Electric got 45 percent, Westinghouse got
 35 percent, and Allis-Chalmers and Federal
 Pacific got 10 percent each (Smith, 1961
 p. 137). Since total profits are linear in the
 shares, such a mechanism still yields maxi-
 mal total expected profits.
 The second reason for using rotating bids
 comes from the fact that, since the mecha-
 nism of Theorem 1 works by using the seller
 as a randomizing device, the seller can eas-
 ily disrupt the mechanism by refusing to
 randomize. Instead of awarding the item
 arbitrarily when the bids are tied, the seller
 could announce a deterministic tie-breaking
 rule: for example, he could award the item
 to the smallest firm bidding, or to the bid-
 der whose name comes first in the alphabet.
 Then it would no longer be in the interest
 of bidders so discriminated against to re-
 main in the cartel. The cartel members could
 defeat this ploy by rotating their bids. Mund
 (1960) cites some instances of bidders for
 government contracts switching from an
 identical-bid mechanism to a rotating-bid
 mechanism after the government authorities
 became suspicious about the identical bids.
 There are indications that the U.S. govern-
 ment has recently begun using identical bid-
 ding as a basis for antitrust investigation.
 IV. Strong Cartels
 The cartel modeled in the last section was
 a relatively weak cartel. We now consider a
 stronger cartel, defined by two characteris-
 tics. First, it is able to exclude nonserious
 bidders (i.e., bidders who could never win in
 a noncooperative auction but who might be
 attracted by the cartel's profits), so it does
 not have to impose the no-entry constraint
 (6). Second, it is able to make transfer pay-
 ments among its members. We shall find
 that side-payments enable the cartel to
 achieve efficiency, unlike in the case of no
 transfers (Theorem 1), where efficiency was
 achieved only in the trivial case in which
 collusion did no better than noncooperative
 behavior.10
 An optimal cartel mechanism has the
 property that the bidder with the highest
 value wins if and only if his value exceeds r
 and the seller receives r. The optimal direct
 mechanism that implements this is as fol-
 lows.
 THEOREM 3: The following mechanism is
 incentive-compatible and efficient. Before the
 auction, the cartel members report their valu-
 ations to the mechanism. If no report exceeds
 r, the cartel does not bid in the auction. If at
 least one bid exceeds r, the bidder making the
 highest report v obtains the item and pays a
 total of
 (7) T(v) = F(v) n
 x J(u - r)(n - 1) F(u)' - 1f(u) du + r.
 Each losing bidder receives from the winner
 [T(v)- r]/(n -1), and the seller receives r.
 '0That efficiency can be achieved is perhaps surpris-
 ing in the light of the result of Myerson and Mark
 Satterthwaite (1983) that transfers do not guarantee
 efficiency in general bargaining situations when individ-
 ual rationality is required.
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 This mechanism has the property that all
 losing bidders receive a transfer; in particu-
 lar, and in contrast to the previous section's
 mechanisms, bidders whose value is less than
 the minimum price earn positive profit.
 The cartel's optimal mechanism is not
 unique; there are many mechanisms yield-
 ing the same expected profit as a function of
 valuation. One mechanism corresponding to
 Theorem 3's mechanism has the cartel set-
 ting up an auction of its own.
 COROLLARY: The cartel can implement
 the mechanism of Theorem 3 by holding a
 prior first-price sealed-bid auction. If the
 highest bid in this prior auction exceeds r, the
 winner then bids r in the legitimate auction
 and pays each of the losers an equal share of
 the difference between his bid in the prior
 auction and r.
 To prove this corollary, note that, in the
 new mechanism, bidding T(v) is an equilib-
 rium, because, if all others bid T(v), bid-
 ding T(v) in the new mechanism coincides
 with responding honestly in the direct
 mechanism; also, T(r) = r, so the minimum
 price remains at r.
 The mechanism described in the corollary
 is remarkably similar to a collusive tech-
 nique commonly used in practice. One car-
 tel member is arbitrarily assigned to bid for
 the item without competition from his fel-
 low cartel members. Afterwards, the item is
 reauctioned among the cartel members (in
 the "knockout"). The cartel members then
 share a sum of money equal to the differ-
 ence between the price reached in the car-
 tel's own auction and the price reached in
 the legitimate auction. Such a practice has
 been described in auctions of antiques,
 books, fish, timber, industrial machinery,
 and wool by Ralph Cassady (1967 Ch. 13),
 Cooper (1977 pp. 35-8), Graham and Mar-
 shall (1987), and Arthur Halpern (1985).11
 The only difference between this practice
 and the theoretical optimum is that the
 actual practice, by having the cartel's own
 auction after rather than before the legiti-
 mate auction, runs the risk of an inefficient
 outcome: the cartel might bid on an item
 and then discover that no member values it
 at more than the minimum price. It may,
 however, be possible to mitigate this inef-
 ficiency in practice: according to Halpern
 (1985 p. 3), a cartel often gives its desig-
 nated bidder "authority to use his discretion
 in the bidding based upon his knowledge of
 the market for the desired item."'12
 THEOREM 4: An efficient cartel mecha-
 nism has the property that the winner trans-
 fers to each of the losers an amount equal to
 (8) 7(0) = E[ v(2)-rlv()2rJ
 where v(j) represents the ith order statistic
 and the expectation is taken over the distribu-
 tion of the highest valuation. The winner's
 expected rent is this amount plus the rent he
 would have earned if the auction had been
 noncooperative.
 If the bidding were noncooperative, the
 total expected profit earned by the winning
 bidder would be the expected difference
 "tThe first cartel convicted under the Sherman An-
 titrust Act of 1890, six cast-iron-pipe manufacturers,
 operated a knockout. In those cities not reserved for a
 particular firm, the price was fixed by a central commit-
 tee (this is our r). Before a contract was let, the central
 committee accepted bids from the cartel members for
 the right to the contract. The lowest bidder then bid
 the prearranged price in the legitimate auction, and
 the others submitted higher bids. The surplus was
 periodically distributed to the cartel members in pro-
 portion to their production capacities (Stigler, 1966
 p. 230).
 12In India, according to Robert Wade (1987), the
 central government auctions the right to sell liquor in a
 village. Some villages (those that have succeeded in
 organizing for themselves a village committee) hold a
 prior auction among potential bidders. The winner
 then bids unopposed in the government auction. The
village committee uses the difference between the vil-
 lage auction's price and the government auction's price
 to finance village-level public goods like the mainte-
 nance of wells. Evidently, the villagers have found the
 optimal mechanism.
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 between the highest valuation and the sec-
 ond-highest valuation (given the highest val-
 uation), because the bidding would drive
 the price up to the second-highest valuation
 (see McAfee and McMillan [1987] for de-
 tails). With collusion, the total expected
 profit earned by the cartel is the difference
 between the expected highest valuation and
 the minimum price (given that this differ-
 ence is positive), because the price paid to
 the seller is the minimum price. Thus, the
 extra expected profit resulting from the car-
 tel's activity, to be shared among the cartel
 members, is the difference between these
 two profit levels, or the expected second-
 highest valuation minus the minimum price.
 Theorem 4 has each of the cartel members
 getting an equal share of this sum (including
 the winner, whose total payment including
 his transfers to fellow cartel members is this
 amount less than what it would have been
 under noncooperative bidding).'3
 In practice, some cartels use sealed-bid
 auctions in the knockout (Halpern, 1985),
 but others use oral auctions (Cassady, 1967).
 However, in Theorem 4 it is essential that a
 first-price sealed-bid auction be used by the
 cartel; an oral auction would not work. This
 is because incentive compatibility requires
 that the payment to the losing bidders does
 not depend on their actual values. The price
 reached in an oral auction is the actual
 second value, whereas in a first-price auc-
 tion it is the expected second value given
 the highest value, which depends only on
 the winner's value. In an oral knockout auc-
 tion, as Cassady (1967 p. 182) and Stigler
 (1966 p. 231) noted, a bidder might overbid
 to raise the final price and thereby raise the
 transfer he receives if he loses: in other
 words, the oral knockout is not incentive-
 compatible. In particular, the use of the
 oral auction leads a bidder with value r to
 bid more than r, destroying efficiency. This
 would result in the winner paying more for
 the item that if the bidding had been nonco-
 operative. In contrast, if the knockout uses
 a sealed-bid auction, losing bidders cannot
 raise the price by overbidding; instead they
 rationally bid the expected second-highest
 valuation conditional on their own valuation
 being the highest (as in an ordinary sealed-
 bid auction: see McAfee and McMillan
 [1987] for details), and thus the optimal
 mechanism of Theorem 3 is implemented.
 In some situations, incentive constraints
 can be relaxed by eliminating the require-
 ment that side-payments always sum to zero
 and just requiring that they sum to zero on
 average (cf. Theodore Groves, 1973; Bengt
 Holmstrom, 1982). In the case of a bidding
 cartel, this would allow the cartel to dis-
 tribute the surplus gained from colluding as
 a lump sum, instead of as a random pay-
 ment depending on values, thereby elimi-
 nating some of the incentive effects in
 bidding. However, Theorem 3 shows that
 efficiency can be achieved without breaking
 the budget; there is nothing to be gained by
 employing a third party as a budget-breaker.
 Nevertheless, there is one advantage to hav-
 ing a budget-breaker: the optimal mecha-
 nism can be implemented in dominant
 strategies. This is done by running the car-
 tel's auction as a Vickrey auction and hav-
 ing the budget-breaker return the expected
 surplus to all bidders as a lump sum. It
 appears to be impossible for the cartel to
 implement an efficient outcome as a domi-
 nant-strategy equilibrium without breaking
 the budget (cf. Claude d'Aspremont and
 Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet, 1979).
 V. Random Reserve Prices and
 Incomplete Cartels
 What changes in our analysis if, instead
 of all bidders being in the cartel, only some
 of them are? A cartel that does not involve
 all the potential bidders may lose the bid-
 ding even when it bids in excess of the
 reserve price. The beginning point of the
 analysis of a partial cartel is formally equiv-
 alent to the analysis of a complete cartel
 facing a random reserve price. Suppose that
 the distribution of reserve prices, realized
 13Graham and Marshall (1987) model the use of a
 knockout with all losing bidders receiving equal side-
 payments in English and Vickrey auctions. Theorem 4
 supplements their analysis by showing that the knock-
 out with equal profits is the optimal mechanism for the
 cartel: there is no other mechanism, no matter how
 complicated, that does better.
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 after the bidding takes place, is G; that is, if
 b is the highest bid submitted by the cartel,
 then b wins with probability G(b). We con-
 sider the case of strong cartels. If v is the
 maximum value of the cartel, then the most
 the cartel can earn is
 (9) max (v - b)G(b).
 b
 We let BC maximize (9). A strong cartel can
 realize the profits in (9) using a prior auc-
 tion, similar to the result in Theorem 3. The
 cartel holds a prior sealed-bid auction for
 the right to represent the cartel in the auc-
 tion. The highest bidder in the prior auction
 pays his bid to the cartel, and this is divided
 evenly among the losing bidders. Facing no
 competition from other cartel members, the
 winning bidder will then choose to bid BC(V)
 in the legitimate auction. As is shown in the
 Appendix, if the cartel contains k members
 and there are n - k nonmembers, the bid in
 the prior auction will be
 (10) 13(v) = F(vy) k
 x f[s - Bc(s)]G(Bc(s))(k - 1)F(s)k - 'f(s) ds.
 If the cartel is incomplete, nonmembers
 who know a cartel exists will, of course,
 react to the existence of the cartel. Suppose
 nonmembers use the increasing bidding
 function BN(V). Then, the probability that
 any one nonmember bids less than b is
 F(B-'(b)). Thus,
 10 b<r
 G(b) =F(B-1(b)) n -k b ?r.
 Thus, a pure-strategy equilibrium is defined
 by the pair of equations
 (11) Bc(V) = argmax(v - b)F(B-1(b))nk
 b 2 r
 for v 2 r
 (12) BN(V)= argmax(v-b)F(BN-(b))n-kl
 b2r
 x F(B-&(b))k for v ? r.
 Formally, (11) and (12) define an equilib-
 rium when one bidder has a value drawn
 from the distribution Fk, and the other
 n - k bidders have draws from the distribu-
 tion F. It is not generally known when
 bidding equilibria exist in this environment.
 Because of the complexities of this environ-
 ment, we now turn to a simpler model.
 Each potential bidder has a value v E {0, 1},
 and p = Pr{v = 1}. As before, values are in-
 dependently distributed. The reserve price r
 is in (0,1). We use the notation fl k, and
 Nl., for the ex ante (before values are real-
 ized) profits of a cartel member and non-
 member, respectively, when there are k
 members of a cartel. Bidders in this envi-
 ronment will randomize, and we consider
 equilibria in which all nonmembers use the
 same mixed strategy GN. Should any cartel
 member have a high value, the cartel selects
 a representative to participate in the auc-
 tion without competition from other cartel
 members. The following theorem provides a
 characterization of the equilibrium in this
 example.
 THEOREM 5: Suppose there are n bidders
 and k cartel members. Ex ante profits of
 nonmembers are
 fl= (1 -r)(1 -p) p
 and exceed profits of members,
 fl[ = (1- r)(1 - p)nfk(1/k)[1 -(1 _ p)k]
 Nonmembers with high value choose a bid
 from the distribution
 G 1-r )1/(n k) 1-p
 GN( b) = 1 -b JP
 for bE(r,bI
 and the cartel representative bids according
 to the distribution
 1 (-r 1/(n k)
 (- P) bl(l- p) P)k
 Gc(b) = -1-(1-P) b
 for b -[r,b]
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 if k < n, and submits a bid of r if k = n.
 Finally,
 b = 1- (1 -r)( -p)
 It is interesting to note that Gc(r)> 0;
 that is, the cartel submits a bid r with
 positive probability. Moreover, the total
 profits of the cartel, conditional on a high
 value, equal the expected profits of any non-
 member who has a high value. However, a
 larger cartel produces greater per capita
 profits:
 (13) (k+l)flk l > kflk + IlI
 Consider the following cartel-formation
 game. All bidders are simultaneously asked
 if they would like to join the cartel. Those
 who respond "yes" are members, while
 those saying "no" are nonmembers, and the
 auction bidding game is played. A pure-
 strategy equilibrium to the simultaneous
 cartel formation game is defined by
 (14) rlk > ikI
 (15) rik+1 < k
 That individuals slated by the equilibrium to
 be cartel members wish to join is guaran-
 teed by (14), and similarly that nonmembers
 do not wish to join is guaranteed by (15).
 Conditions (14) and (15) define an equilib-
 rium cartel size.
 THEOREM 6: An equilibrium to the cartel-
 formation game has k* cartel members if
 1-(1)_ p_k 1_ _ pk +1I
 k* 2 p(l - p)> k* +1
 For almost every p, k* is unique. k* > 3, k*
 is nondecreasing for p> 0, and k* oc as
 p 1.
 Cartels, in the simultaneous-formation
 game, have at least three members, and the
 number of members is independent of the
 number of potential members, although of
 course k* < n.
 A somewhat different formation game
 leads to a cartel of the whole set of bidders.
 Suppose the cartel sequentially goes through
 the set of potential bidders, offering a side-
 payment si to bidder i to join the cartel,
 and if a bidder refuses to join the cartel, no
 one else is asked to join. This procedure
 leads to the cartel of the whole, by (13),
 which guarantees that there is always a
 sufficient side-payment. Of course, the rule
 that the cartel stops growing as soon as any
 bidder refuses to join is difficult to justify.
 A natural extension of this analysis would
 permit multiple cartels. However, this cre-
 ates difficulties in constructing the bidding
 equilibrium, because it appears that smaller
 cartels will no longer randomize their bids
 with the same support as the larger cartels.
 We have been unable to characterize the
 optimal strategy for a weak cartel. However,
 consider the weak cartel facing a random
 reserve price with distribution G. Provided
 G is concave, the coordinated cartel selects
 a member to be a representative, and then
 this member bids Bc(vi) if he has value vi.
 While this result is useful for the random
 reserve price, it appears less promising for
 the case of an incomplete cartel, for G is
 endogenous. In addition, the problems of
 existence of bidding functions for the strong
 cartel seem likely to arise with weak cartels
 as well.14
 VI. The Seller's Response
 Whether the cartel is weak or strong, the
 effect on the seller is the same: the highest
 bid submitted equals the minimum price."5
 140n collusion by subsets of bidders in English and
 second-price auctions, see Graham and Marshall (1987)
 and Malaith and Zemsky (1991).
 15Collusion is common in the U.S. Forest Service's
 auctions of federally owned timber, because trans-
 portation costs mean that often only local mills bid
 (W. J. Mead, 1967). For instance, in the ponderosa
 pine region in the early 1980's, in 30 percent of the
 auctions the winning bid was within 1 percent of the
 reserve price. In some of these auctions only local firms
 bid; in others, there was competition from outside
 firms. Consistent with the hypothesis that outside com-
 petition destroys collusion among the local firms, in
 those auctions in which outsiders bid, the winning bid
 was 2-3 times the reserve price (Mead et al., 1983).
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 Suppose the seller can somehow recognize
 that he faces organized bidders. What
 strategies can the seller use to counter the
 cartel? We shall discuss three types of strat-
 egy: raising the reserve price, keeping the
 reserve price secret, and interfering with
 the cartel's enforcement mechanism.
 What is the seller's objective function? If
 the seller is the government, concerned only
 with efficiency, then, to the extent that col-
 lusive profits represent a pure transfer, the
 seller is indifferent about the cartel's exis-
 tence. Indeed, in this case, the government
 should prefer a strong cartel (using transfer
 payments) to a weak cartel, for this en-
 sures the efficiency of the outcome (cf. The-
 orems 1 and 3). However, if government
 revenue is raised by distortionary taxation,
 as is realistically the case, then the collusive
 profits earned by the cartel cause a welfare
 loss: the government/seller would be con-
 cerned about the cartel's profits. Similarly,
 if the seller is a risk-neutral individual or
 firm, the objective would be to maximize
 own expected surplus. Let us assume from
 here on that this is the case.
 The seller can set the reserve price so as
 to mitigate the effects of the cartel (assum-
 ing he knows the number of cartel mem-
 bers). Let J(v) = v -[1- F(v)]/f(v) and
 assume the standard regularity condition:
 J(v) is strictly increasing.16 The seller's ex-
 pected return is (r - vO)[1 - F(r)n], where
 vo is the seller's return if he fails to sell the
 item. Maximization of this over r yields the
 optimal anticartel reserve price rc, satisfying
 1-Ff rc)
 nF (rc ) n lf ( rc)
 This is a special case of a result of Graham
 and Marshall (1987). The reserve price im-
 plied by (16) is higher than the optimal
 reserve price when the bidding is noncoop-
 erative, rn, defined by
 (17) r~-V0- 1-F(rn)
 n f(rn)
 (Myerson, 1981; John Riley and William
 Samuelson, 1981). Thus, upon discovering
 that the bidders are colluding, the seller
 raises his reserve price, setting it higher the
 larger is the number of cartel members.
 The imposition of the anticartel reserve
 price rc lowers the profits of the bidders.
 Indeed, if there are few bidders, collusive
 profits with the reserve price rc may be
 lower than noncooperative profits with the
 reserve price rn. This is illustrated in Table
 1, for F uniform on [0,1] and v0 either 0 or
 0.5. Profits under noncooperative bidding,
 implicit collusion, and explicit collusion are
 listed for various numbers of bidders, n.
 Note that, for v0 = 0, there must be at least
 nine bidders before detectable implicit col-
 lusion becomes profitable; for v0 = 0.5,
 there must be 19 or more bidders.
 This example suggests that the seller's
 choice of action will affect bidding behavior
 by both collusive and noncollusive bidders.
 If the discount rate is low enough, an indus-
 try with few firms will have an incentive not
 to collude, because current gains will be
 outweighed by lost future profits after the
 seller detects the collusion and raises the
 reserve price to its anticartel level. Paradox-
 ically, Table 1 suggests that, if the seller
 adjusts the reserve price optimally, collusion
 is more likely in industries with many firms
 than in industries with few firms. Also, the
 method by which the seller deduces that he
 faces a cartel (e.g., by observing a sequence
 of bids near the reserve price) will affect the
 decision of the bidders on whether or not to
 collude. The threat of a higher reserve price
 may be enough to deter collusion. However,
 the dynamic equilibrium involving the threat
 of a raised reserve price and the bidders'
 optimizing responses to it is beyond the
 scope of this paper.
 Our analysis assumed that all bidders
 know the minimum price r. In practice,
 reserve prices are often kept secret; this is
 sometimes explained as an anticartel device.
 16This condition ensures that the seller does not use
 a stochastic policy (see Myerson, 1981; Eric Maskin
 and Riley, 1984; McAfee and McMillan, 1987). In
 terms of the cases considered in Theorem 2, the as-
 sumption on J implies that H'(v) < 1; thus, the as-
 sumption underlying Theorem 2's identical-bidding re-
 sult is weaker than the standard regularity condition.
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 TABLE 1-COLLUSIVE PROFITS AND RESERVE PRICES
 vO = 0, r. = 0.5 vO = 0.5, rn = 0.75
 n rc W i re Wn rc v i We Tn
 2 0.58 0.070 0.077 0.083 0.77 0.024 0.025 0.026
 3 0.63 0.046 0.053 0.057 0.78 0.019 0.020 0.022
 4 0.67 0.033 0.039 0.041 0.80 0.015 0.017 0.018
 5 0.70 0.025 0.031 0.030 0.81 0.013 0.014 0.016
 6 0.72 0.020 0.025 0.022 0.82 0.011 0.012 0.013
 7 0.74 0.016 0.020 0.017 0.83 0.009 0.011 0.011
 8 0.76 0.013 0.017 0.014 0.84 0.007 0.010 0.010
 9 0.77 0.011 0.015 0.011 0.84 0.007 0.008 0.008
 10 0.79 0.010 0.013 0.009 0.85 0.006 0.007 0.007
 15 0.83 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.88 0.004 0.005 0.004
 20 0.86 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.89 0.002 0.003 0.002
 Notes: F is uniform on [0, 1]. n = number of bidders; rc = anticartel reserve price;
 7r, = implicitly collusive profit per firm (with reserve price rc); Wre = explicitly collusive
 profit per firm (with reserve price rc); and Wn = noncooperative profit per firm (with
 reserve price rn).
 Should the seller announce r? There are
 two cases. First, suppose the seller's valua-
 tion vo is common knowledge and it is com-
 mon knowledge whether the seller perceives
 that a cartel exists, so that all bidders know
 which of (16) and (17) apply. Then the bid-
 ders can deduce r even if it is not an-
 nounced: the seller is indifferent between
 announcing and not announcing. Second,
 suppose vo is not common knowledge, or it
 is not common knowledge which of (16) or
 (17) the seller will use. Then there is one
 sense in which the seller gains by keeping r
 secret. For the bidders to be able to coordi-
 nate their bids, they must agree in their
 estimates of r. Not announcing r forces the
 bidders to communicate in order to deter-
 mine the level of the winning bid. The need
 for communication may make the cartel
 more fragile (cf. Section III).
 Suppose the cartel uses trigger strategies
 as its enforcement mechanism, reverting to
 noncooperative behavior in some or all fu-
 ture auctions if a nondesignated bidder wins.
 Then, as a general rule, the seller should
 make the environment as stochastic as pos-
 sible for the cartel, so as to cause the trigger
 to be set off accidentally: for example, the
 seller might occasionally choose the wrong
 bidder (provided he does not reveal the
 winner's bid). Also, as Milgrom (1987) ar-
 gued, trigger strategies work better in orql
 auctions than in sealed-bid auctions, for the
 punishment for deviation comes immedi-
 ately, instead of in the next auction. Thus, a
 seller concerned about possible collusion
 should choose a sealed-bid auction rather
 than an oral auction. Finally, the larger the
 prize, the greater the temptation to defect
 from the cartel, because the effective dis-
 count rate is larger. In the case of contract
 bidding, this implies that it is better to offer
 a project as a single large contract than to
 break it up into several smaller contracts.
 VII. Conclusion
 We have modeled bidding cartels with
 and without side-payments among mem-
 bers. In each case, the effect on the seller is
 the same: just as if there were only one
 bidder, the price paid is the minimum price.
 From the bidders' point of view, however,
 there are differences. With transfers, effi-
 ciency is achieved so that the bidders' ex-
 pected profit is maximized. Without trans-
 fers, efficiency is not attainable; the winner
 is arbitrarily selected from those bidders
 who value the item at more than the mini-
 mum price.
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 APPENDIX
 PROOF OF THE LEMMA:
 In the noncooperative equilibrium of a
 first-price sealed-bid auction with reserve
 price r, it is well known that an agent with
 value v bids
 (Al) B(v) = v - F(v) (n-1) vF(u)n- du
 (Myerson, 1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981;
 Milgrom and Weber, 1982; McAfee and
 McMillan, 1987).
 Since the probability of winning is
 F(V)n- 1, this yields expected profit of
 frvF(U)n-1du, so that, by integration by
 parts, ex ante expected profits (before val-
 ues are known) are
 (A2) Ewr = |h[1-FF(u)IF(u)n du.
 Now, incentive compatibility (2), efficiency
 (4), and zero profits for values at or below
 the reserve price imply that expected profits
 are
 (A3) Vh T(u)f(u)du = vfi(u)f(u)du
 = -7i(u)[1 - F(u)]Irh
 Vh d -rr
 + -[1- F(u)] du
 1rdu
 = f[1 - F(uF(u)n1 du
 r
 the same as noncooperative profit (A2).
 PROOF OF THEOREM 1:
 Because transfers are impossible and the
 minimum acceptable bid is r, any bidder
 with value less than r must make nonposi-
 tive profit. It follows that any scheme that
 allows bidders with values less than r to win
 is dominated by one in which they lose, as
 (A4) fVhiri(v)f( v) dv
 < ? Of(v) dv + |?f i (v)f(v) dv.
 Thus, expected profits are
 (AS) ETri(v)
 = fVri(v)f(v) dv
 r
 =-i(v)[l - F(v)]Ihr
 + f[1 - F(v)]Eihi(vi,v_i) dv.
 r
 Thus, the sum of expected profits is
 n n
 (A6) E E ri(v) = E E H(vi)hi(vi,v_i).
 i=1 i=1
 In the case H'(v) ? 0, the profit-maxi-
 mizing scheme has the highest-value bidder
 winning if and only if his value exceeds r.
 By the lemma, this results in noncoopera-
 tive profits. In the case H'(v) < 0, the opti-
 mal collusive scheme maximizes total ex-
 pected profits (A6) subject to
 (A7) vi < r -- hit(viv) = 0
 (A8) ? ' hi' Vi'V-i)
 n
 (A9) Ehi' vi,v_J < 1
 (A10) d E_ihi(vijv_i) > ?.
 From (A7) and (A9), we have
 n
 (All) E ,hi(vi,v_i)< 1-[F(r)]n
 i= 1
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 Let A i(vi) = E ihi(v-,v ). Then, total ex-
 pected profits are
 tfh1[- F(vi) 1 fv
 (A12) f (vj) Ai(vi)f(vi)dv
 n
 XJ[1 - ]F(r)
 () ) ( f( ) ) ] dv
 x Ai~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- (v i) d__ ___
 fJ (r) (r
 n
 < [1f - F(r)]
 [J.vh(i-(F'iv ) ) h(viv)
 = 1 F(v (i) 1 - x J E Rif vi)ff (vi) v
 F (r) ) dv (1-[F(r)]d).
 The first inequality holds since
 [1 - F(vi)]/f(v1) is decreasing and -F(vr) is
 nondecreasing, (and thus the expected value
 of the product does not exceed the product
 of the expected values). The second in-
 equality follows from (Al11).
 One implementation of the bound on
 profits in (A12) is for all bidders with values
 in excess of r to bid r, since profits are:
 vi = [ - r)f(v) dv]
 n - 1 (n-
 ~~~n - 1
 j. [ j + 1)
 x [1- F(r)]I[F(r)In -j1
 =[Vh[d]
 = [fUh1-F(v)] dv n[1-F(r)]
 n
 k = 1
 1 ,fh[ 1 -F(r) ]( [F(r) n )
 and summing achieves the bound.
 PROOF OF THEOREM 2:
 It is sufficient to show that maximum ex-
 pected profits satisfy (A6). From (2) and (6),
 (A13) fVh()fU)d
 .-o
 = fVh dv
 = - (v)- F(v)]l
 +EZ J l[F(vi)]hn(vl-vFr)d
 n= 1 f F(r) h k ( n - k
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 That is, the constraint (6) means that the
 cartel maximizes the same objective func-
 tion subject to the same constraints as in
 Theorem 1.
 PROOF OF THEOREM 3:
 Suppose that the mechanism described in
 the theorem is operating and suppose that a
 bidder with value v reports w. Since a re-
 port of w < r will never win and hence
 results in constant profit, we need only con-
 sider the case w 2 r. From (7), the bidder
 gets expected profits of
 (A14) vr =[v U-T(w)]F(w)' -
 + [1-F(w)n-]
 J h T(u)- r (n -d)F(u) -2fUu
 n, n-1 1-F( W3n-1
 =[v u-T(W 3F( W)n- l
 +fh [T(u)- r]F(u)2f(u)du.
 w
 Thus,
 (A15) - = [v - T(w)J(n - 1)F(w)n-2f(W)
 -T'(W)F(W3n - I
 -[T(w) - r I W)n -2f (W)
 = [(n - 1)v - nT(w) + r]F(w)n -2f(w)
 -T'(w)F(w)n -.
 Since d%2r/dv aw 0, incentive compatibil-
 ity is characterized by
 (A16) 0.
 dw W=V
 Now, from (7),
 (A17) d3w w|1
 = [(n - 1)v + r -nF(v) n
 x r (u - r)(n - I)F(u)n -f(u) du - nrj
 X F(V)n-2f(V)
 - F(V)n - nF(v)-(n +)f(V)
 x (u - r)(n - 1)F(u )n- 'f(u) du
 r
 + F(v) n[(V-r)(n-1)F(V)n-If(V)]
 (n - 1)vF(v)' -2f(v)- nF(v )-2f(v)
 X f (u - r)(n - 1)F(u) du r
 -(n - 1)rF(v)n -2f(v) + nF(uv) 2f(V)
 X (u - r)(n -1)F(u) f(u) du
 -(n - 1)(v - r)F(v)n 2f(v)
 0.
 Thus, the mechanism is incentive-compati-
 ble; it is clearly efficient.
 PROOF OF THEOREM 4:
 Note that, from incentive compatibility,
 d17
 (A18) - =F(v) if v 2 r.
 Thus,
 wrr(O) +J fF( )' if v?>r
 (A19) Ir(v)=
 'T(O) if v < r
 where nr(O) is the transfer received by each
 losing bidder.
 Moreover, the total rent earned by the
 cartel is the expected difference between
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 the winner's value and r, where the den-
 sity function of the winner's value is
 nF(v)n- 'f(v). This total rent must equal
 total expected profits as in (A20):
 (A20) fIJ(Vh-r )nF(v)n-1f(v)dv
 n r
 =I7r(v)f (v) dv
 = (0) + f fJ F(u) - duf (v) dv
 = 7T(O) + f V[ - F(v)]F(v)n -1 dv.
 r
 Hence, the transfer to losing bidders is
 (A21) wr(o)
 J Lh( - r)F(v) ')f (v) dv
 r
 J Ih[1 -F(v)]F(v)n 1ldv
 r
 1rL'hr 1 - F(v) 1
 n L J [ I r] nF(v)n f(v)dv
 1
 =-E[v(2)- rIv(l)? r]
 n
 where v(;) represents the jth order statistic.
 In a first-price sealed-bid auction, bids equal
 the expected second value conditional on
 own value. Since r is the price paid in the
 legitimate auction, the transfer to losers
 70(O) can, from (A21), be interpreted as
 (1/n)th of the difference between the win-
 ning bid in the cartel's sealed-bid auction
 and the bid in the legitimate auction.
 Derivation of (10): Consider a bidder with
 value v who bids ,8(v) in the prior auction.
 He obtains
 7= {[v - B(v)]G(B*(v))- (i(V3)}F(i3 )k -1
 + J f (k - 1)F(s)k - 2f (s) ds
 d [r k
 dv (v-B*(v))G(B*(v))-k 1 0)
 x (k- 1)F(V) V-2v) - F(V) -l,v
 -=G(B*(v))(k- 1)F(U)k 2f(V') >O0.
 Thus, the solution to 0= r1dv/D=v is an
 equilibrium. This linear differential equa-
 tion has solution (10).
 PROOF OF THEOREM 5:
 Suppose the cartel, composed of k firms,
 bids with the distribution Gc, and n - k
 noncartel members bid with distribution GN.
 Cartel profits are, for bid b ? r, provided
 the cartel has a 1,
 rc = (1 -b)[1 - p+ pGN(b)] n -k
 and nonmembers with a 1 obtain
 =rN (1- b)[1 - p + pGN(b)]n-k-1
 x { (1-p)k + [1-(1-p)k ]Gc(b)}-
 Standard arguments insure that GN and Gc
 have no mass points in the interior of
 their support or at the right endpoint of the
 support, nor do they have any gaps. More-
 over, 7rC = 7rN. To see this, let b be the
 maximum nonmember bid. The maximum
 cartel bid cannot exceed b, or else the car-
 tel obtains higher profits by bidding b.
 Therefore GN(b) = Gc(b) = 1, and 7rN = 1
 - b, and 7rc ? 1- b. Now suppose Gc(bc)
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 = 1, for bc < b. Then, for b E (be, b),
 7rc = (1 -b) [1 -p + pGN(b) ]n
 = 7N[1 -p + pGN(b)]
 < 7T N
 a contradiction. Thus, 7rN = 7rC= 1- b.
 If there are at least two noncartel mem-
 bers, GN(r) = 0, for otherwise a slight in-
 crease in bid brings a discrete increase in
 the probability of winning. For the same
 reason, GN(r)Gc(r)= 0. If GC(r)O= , let
 bc be the left endpoint of G 's support.
 Then,
 F7C = (1-bc) [1-p + pGN(bc)]nk
 < (1- bc) [1-p + pGN(bc)]nk1
 a contradiction. Thus bc = r. Even with n -
 k = 1, GN(r) = 0, since GN(r) > 0 implies
 Gc(r)0= , and
 vc = (1- r)(1-p)
 > (1 -r)(1_ 1
 = 7TN
 a contradiction.
 GN(r) = 0 shows
 = = (1-cr)(1p)
 which yields
 GN(b)=( b) - ]
 for r < b < b
 1-r )1/(n-fk)
 c 1-(1- ~~p)k
 for r < b < b
 Hence,
 1 _ p _0 _p) k Pk
 The ex ante profit of a nonmember is
 (A22) HN = WNP = (1(-r)(1 p) p
 and the ex ante profit of a cartel member is
 (A23) cI5 ='7T1 k
 (1- r)(1 -p))n-k 1 (1p)
 k
 N -1C. because(1 ) + kp ? 1 (the
 left-hand side is 1 at p = 0, with derivative
k[l _ (1 _ p)k - 1 ] 2 0).
 PROOF OF THEOREM 7:
 Substitution of (A22) and (A23) into (14)
 and (15) yield the first statement. Since
 [1 _ (1 _ p)k ]/ k is decreasing in k, there is
 a unique k* associated with a stable cartel.
 Since 1 - (1 - p)3 = 3p(1 - p) + p3, k* 2 3.
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